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I. INTRODUCTION
One way that contemporary American society manifests its height-
ened concern for the well-being of children is by providing specialized
systems for dealing with problems of juvenile misconduct and malad-
justment. This specialization is most apparent in the creation of juve-
nile courts, but is also evident in society's response to mental health
problems among children. It is, however, increasingly apparent that
these differentiated systems are not producing the results that were
expected to flow from recognition of the unique nature of delinquency
and mental illness in children.
The inadequacy of these interventions is part of a larger pattern of
development: systems that were designed to diverge from the crimi-
nal justice model-most notably, the mental health system-have in-
stead taken on the characteristics of criminal justice, to the dismay of
almost all concerned. Yet the best of motives produced the "legaliza-
tion" of these systems, and the wish to return to their imagined
"prelegal" forms is naive, if not sinister. Nevertheless, the causes and
dynamics of this legalization, and the effects it has had on these alter-
native systems and their clients must be studied because the process is
ongoing.
This Article will describe this process of imitation, first in the para-
digm case of the mental health system, and then in the juvenile justice
system and in the evolving system for commitment of juveniles to
mental health facilities. The Article first compares the criminal jus-
tice and mental health systems, showing the growing similarity of the
two; this part of the Article also introduces a visual representation of
the process within each system (Figure 1). Second, this Article uses
the visual representation to show a parallel development in the juve-
nile justice system. The last part of this Article demonstrates the po-
tential for analogous evolution in that portion of the mental health
system devoted to juveniles (Figure 2).
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II. THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE AND MENTAL HEALTH
SYSTEMS
The mental health system is increasingly being patterned after a
criminal justice system that has already proved itself inadequate for
accomplishing its primary goals of punishment, deterrence, rehabilita-
tion, and protection of society, as well as its secondary goal of treat-
ment of mentally ill criminals. By design and by default, the mental
health system has assumed a pattern of imprecise induction, perfunc-
tory rehabilitation, and arbitrary release identical to that seen in
prison systems throughout our history. Indeed the two systems are
merging, in that the most deviant clients of both systems are being
aimlessly shifted back and forth bq.w~en the two systems.
Visual depictions of the mental health and criminal justice systems
are presented in Figure 1. The A angles of the triangles represent
induction into each system; the B angles represent treatment and re-
1989]
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habilitation; and the C angles represent the inmates' conduit to society
outside of the institution. Progress from one angle to the next may be
described along the connecting sides, which are rife with analogous
issues of treatment, personal rights, thwarted good intentions, benign
neglect, and conscious abuse.
A. Angles A' and A'
Development of angles A' and A' is crucial in both systems because
it is the point at which the twin losses of liberty and privacy occur for
those committed into the mental health system or detained by agents
of the criminal justice system. Persons can enter the mental health
system voluntarily or involuntarily, and the area of involuntary civil
commitment has brought a flood of discussion, debate, and legislation
over the past fifteen years.1 Most, if not all states have enacted mental
health laws that provide specific procedures to be followed in the in-
voluntary commitment process to provide due process to these per-
sons. However, involuntary commitment hearings are being
conducted more and more like adversarial criminal trials, and they
have adopted much of the apparatus of the legal system. 2 Thus, it is
with the apprehension of the involuntary commitment of mentally ill
persons that the legalization of the mental health system first be-
comes apparent.
Upon close examination of this systemwide legalization, two meth-
ods in which the mental health system mimics the criminal justice sys-
tem emerge. First, procedures are being copied. Second,
developmental patterns are similar: high development at angles A'
and A2; confusion, often misguided experimentation, and failure at an-
gles B1 and B'; and utter arbitrariness at angles C' and C'. In discuss-
ing the developments in and merger of the two systems, one should
ask several questions, such as who instigates or inhibits change; who
benefits and who loses from the developments; and whether mental
health and criminal justice professionals have formed a pitiful sort of
1. For a thorough presentation of statutory provisions for involuntary institutional-
ization in all states and the District of Columbia, see S. BRAKEL, J. PARRY & B.
WEINER, THE MENTALLY DISABLED AND THE LAW 76-81 (3d ed. 1985). See also
National Center for State Courts, Guidelinesfor Involuntary Civil Commitment,
10 MENTAL HEALTH & PHYSICAL DISABILITY L. REP. 409 (1986).
2. In the past decade, the states' power to commit persons who have not committed
crimes has been substantially diminished. Mental illness is a necessary require-
ment for involuntary civil commitment, and this definition relies upon the legal
interpretation of state statutes. Most states now require representation by coun-
sel, judicial hearings with patient notification, and a standard of "clear and con-
vincing evidence" for proving dangerousness and mental disorder. These
innovations are grounded in the fourteenth amendment's due process and equal
protection clauses. See generally R. SIMON, CLINICAL PSYCHIATRY AND THE LAW
176-78 (1986).
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alliance that allows them to keep society's most impaired people
either hidden away or wandering precariously between the systems.
There has-been a high degree of development at angle A' in the
criminal justice system for many years. Protections that have devel-
oped include the fourth amendment's prohibition of unlawful searches
and seizures; Miranda v. Arizona,3 which requires that a person
placed under arrest must be informed of his rights, including the right
to remain silent; Gideon v. Wainwrght,4 which guarantees the right
to defense counsel in criminal cases; fifth and sixth amendment guar-
antees of the right to a fair trial and not to incriminate oneself; and
more recently, sentencing guidelines which help to ensure that sus-
pects' rights to due process are not violated. The various mental
health acts that govern the involuntary detention and processing of
the mentally ill also provide considerable protections and mirror the
importance given liberty and privacy rights.
Lawyers, not mental health professionals, were most instrumental
in creating these safeguards and protections at angles A' and A'. Law-
yers not only responded to crises that resulted in litigation; some also
became accomplished advocates for the mentally ill as they pressed an
agenda that has made detention and commitment proceedings closely
approximate to those associated with arrest and conviction. Funda-
mental to these developments is the need to define the goals of invol-
untary commitment and to ask if mental health practitioners have
largely abdicated their role as primary advocates for the mentally ill.
If involuntary commitment is designed to prevent the mentally ill
from harming themselves or others, and to get them into environ-
ments where they can be helped, mental health professionals should
support such commitment. If the legalization at angle AF is to be pre-
vented from increasingly duplicating processes in the criminal justice
system, such as lockups and adversarial hearings, mental health pro-
fessionals must become both active participants in the induction of
mentally ill persons at angle A' and informed advocates concerning
appropriate procedures for the population involved. Policemen, law-
yers, judges, and hearing masters who allegedly run a harsh and inap-
propriate system of involuntary commitment of mental patients will
change only after mental health professionals help to instigate and
shape the desired change. Moreover, isolated criticism of the induc-
tion process diverts attention away from the potentially more serious
problem of ineffective, damaging, or nonexistent treatment modalities
that inductees know await them. If mental health professionals are to
gain and maintain control over the mental health system, they will not
only have to increase their input into the induction process at angle
3. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
4. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
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A2, but they will also have to clearly define and operationalize what
happens after induction.
B. A'-+B', or A--B
2
After confinement, both mental health patients and prisoners have
rights they may assert regarding their well-being and ultimate release.
These rights are most appropriately considered in our visual depiction
on the sides between A' and B' and A' and B'. Again, the mental
health system is copying and catching up with the criminal justice
system.
Over the past hundred years, the issue of whether prisoners retain
fundamental rights has been debated and litigated. The original atti-
tude of the courts that a prisoner had the status of "a slave of the
state" with no rights5 has given way to the view that "a prisoner re-
tains all the rights of an ordinary citizen except those expressly, or by
necessary implication, taken from him by law."6
While the conflict between safeguarding prisoners' rights and ob-
serving institutional requirements relating to custody, security, reha-
bilitation, discipline, punishment, and resource limitations is
continuous, prisoners have always been able to rely on constitutional
protections of fundamental rights, particularly the eighth amend-
ment's prohibition against cruel and inhuman punishment.
Over the past fifteen to twenty years, legislation and cases have
begun to create laws similarly protecting the rights of institutionalized
mentally ill persons. During this upsurge of debate over rights of the
mentally ill, the right to treatment, and the right to refuse treatment,
established in cases such as O'Connor v. Donaldson7 and Rennie v.
Klein 8, have been major developments for the mental health system.
Again, it has been lawyers who have led in this reform movement,
while mental health professionals have responded defensively to this
creation of rights as they attempt to particularize the new legal re-
gime. Like the criminal justice system, the mental health system has
reacted to attempts by lawyers, legislators, and judges to buttress the
rights of the incarcerated. Like their counterparts in the prison sys-
tem, mental health professionals have failed to provide the impetus
for reform, in spite of the fact that they are the most informed con-
cerning the indignities suffered.
This further legalization of the mental health system raises addi-
tional questions about the professed and actual goals of that system.
5. Ruffin v. Commonwealth, 62 Va. (21 Gratt.) 790, 796 (1871).
6. Coffin v. Reichard, 143 F.2d 443, 445 (6th Cir. 1944).
7. 422 U.S. 563 (1975).
8. 476 F. Supp. 1294 (D.N.J. 1979). For a comprehensive presentation of the rights of
institutionalized mentally ill patients, see S. BRAKEL, J. PARRY & B. WEINER,
supra note 1, at 251-325.
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Modern mental health professionals speak with disdain and disbelief
about the days of the "snake pits" when mentally ill patients were
confined in filthy, dungeon-like facilities. Yet the fact that the issue of
whether there is a right to treatment reached the courts suggests that
while treatment is the professed goal, in many cases it may be a secon-
dary goal of the mental health system, with confinement as the pri-
mary goal.
C. Angles B' and B'
Although treatment of mentally ill patients and rehabilitation of
criminals are the systems' professed primary goals, failure predomi-
nates at both angles B 1 and B'. This would appear to be an area of
potential control and achievement for mental health professionals,
free from the demands of lawyers, and uninfluenced by the structure
and function of the criminal justice system. This has not been the
case. Instead, mental health professionals have faced competing agen-
das: treatment and rehabilitation versus warehousing.
The failure of diagnosis and treatment has resulted in mental
health practitioners once more succumbing to the temptation to let
lawyers intervene to put their therapeutic house in order. They peri-
odically look to the criminal justice system to "handle" problem
groups such as alcoholics, drug abusers, child abusers, and those sim-
plistically labeled "sociopaths." Furthermore, they acquiesce in the
relabeling of groups so that "clients" can more readily be floated be-
tween the two systems. The labeling and relabeling of sex offenders is
a case in point. Previously called "sexual deviants" and "sexual psy-
chopaths," such persons are now called "mentally disordered sex of-
fenders" (MDSO). In spite of this recognition that sexual offenders
require treatment, there is ongoing debate over whether they belong
in the mental health or criminal justice imprisonment systems.9 This
ambivalence has often resulted in the mental health system adopting
the same sort of gratuitous warehousing of society's most deviant per-
sons that characterizes the criminal justice system.
Failure to achieve the goals of treatment and rehabilitation, and
the indecision regarding what to do with those neither system can
help, summarize the two most salient similarities between the mental
health and criminal justice systems at angles B' and B'. The most ap-
parent difference is that the criminal justice system has practically ad-
mitted its failure to rehabilitate, while the mental health system has
only partially acknowledged its ineffectiveness at angle B.
Thus, widespread resignation and a shifted focus to other goals,
such as deterrence, punishment, and protection of society now
9. See, e.g., Weiner, Legal Issues Raised in Treating Sex Offenders, 3 BEHAVIORAL
Sci. & L. 325 (1985).
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predominate the criminal justice system. Efforts to rehabilitate are ad
hoc, piecemeal, and often superficial. Such resignation largely ac-
counts for the fact that there is no viable reform movement within the
criminal justice system. Rather, maintaining the status quo, avoiding
individual or class action lawsuits, and merely keeping society's most
dangerous misfits "off the streets" are primary concerns of that sys-
tem. Meanwhile, court dockets build up, plea bargaining takes place
at a furious pace, jails remain indecently overcrowded, and the public
fights the building of new jails and prisons if it will mean higher taxes
or that those facilities will be located in their neighborhoods.
Although the mental health system is having little success treating its
most severely impaired people, defeat has not yet been admitted. Wild
sweeps at solutions to problems associated with treatment are still be-
ing made, such as the ill-fated community mental health movement
and the massive use of antipsychotic drugs. Ironically, these very at-
tempts at reform and innovation have evoked charges of irresponsibil-
ity and abuse from mental health lawyers, patients, and their families.
Once again lawyers have intervened in the mental health system with
cases involving the right to refuse mind-altering drugsio and other in-
trusive technologies such as electroconvulsive therapy"' and psycho-
surgery.1 2 Therefore, mental health lawyers have also influenced the
type of treatment that mental health practitioners can legally
administer.
Thus, the influence that lawyers have had in shaping what meth-
ods are used to bring people into the mental health system, to deter-
mine which rights they maintain, and to set limits on the types of
permissible treatment is clear.
D. The Shuffle: A'---C'--*A' or A2; or A2-- C2--*A2 or A'; or A'-B 2 or
C- .B
2
Habitually failing to achieve their professed goals, the criminal jus-
tice and mental health systems dump their misfits, aberrants, and in-
curables into the streets to survive on their own. Angles C i and C2 are
where the mentally ill are voluntarily or involuntarily deinstitutional-
ized,1 3 and criminals are released either because they have served
their sentences or because the facilities are illegally overcrowded.
10. Rogers v. Okin, 634 F.2d 650 (lst Cir. 1980).
11. Bell v. Wayne County Gen. Hosp., 384 F. Supp. 1085 (E.D. Mich. 1974).
12. Kainowitz v. Michigan Dep't of Mental Health, Civ. No. 73-19434-AW, reprinted
in R. REISNER, LAW AND THE MENTAL HEALTH SYSTEM 176 (1985).
13. See generally Down and Out-But Determined, TIME, Nov. 23, 1987, at 29; Revolv-
ing Doors Trap Mentally Ill, INSIGHT, Oct. 19, 1987, at 22; Abandoned, NEWSWEEK,
Jan. 6, 1986, at 14; The Light that Failed, HOSPITALS, Aug. 16, 1983, at 88; Deinsti-
tutionalization: The Data Demythologized, HOSPITAL & COMMUNITY PSYCHIA-
TRY, Feb. 1983, at 129.
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During confinement, many mentally ill patients become more ad-
ept in the maladaptive ways they have used to survive inside and
outside of the institution, just as do incarcerated criminals. Most
releasees in both groups leave their confinement as dependent, unem-
ployable, stigmatized drifters whom society rejects. Recidivism is ex-
traordinarily high in spite of feeble attempts at aftercare for the
mentally ill and postconfinement guidance for criminals. Deinstitu-
tionalization of mentally ill people was a cornerstone of the commu-
nity mental health movement of the late 1960s and the 1970s. The
concept was designed to remove patients from overly restrictive insti-
tutions that provided little or no effective treatment and place them in
more helpful facilities within their communities. Unfortunately, the
movement was unable to generate the funding and public support to
build, staff, and maintain such needed local facilities, and thousands of
the newly deinstitutionalized became homeless, preyed-upon street
people. Many of them drifted into petty crime and found themselves
entering the criminal justice system at angle A', while others became
the targets of reinstitutionalization efforts.14
Similarly, many criminals released on early parole, probation,
work release, furloughs, house arrest, and similar programs either be-
came vagrants that society rejected and feared, or they returned to
crime and reentered the criminal justice system at angle A' to resume
their hopeless trek. The intense focus on the crimes committed by
furloughed convict Willie Horton during the 1988 presidential cam-
paign is a clear example of the general awareness of public perceptions
of alarm and dismay over what takes place at angle C1.
Many citizens would prefer that there are no angles C' and C', but
that the mentally ill and criminals would stay forever within either
system. However, because release is inevitable, these opponents in-
stead favor quick reinstitutionalization, thus recycling these outcasts
at angles A' or A'. Such opponents to release have little knowledge
about or interest in what occurs at angles B' and B'. In fact, those who
advocate retribution are frequently incensed when criminal defend-
ants and convicts are transferred to the mental health system-from
A' or C' to B--because of the perception that confinement in a mental
institution constitutes "easy time." Furthermore, because many view
the alumni of both systems as interchangeable menaces, fear and out-
rage are expressed when release from either system is seen as prema-
14. New York Mayor Edward Koch initiated a plan in 1987 to reinstitutionalize those
mentally ill street people who posed an imminent danger to themselves or others.
While some mental health professionals supported the plan because they saw it as
a chance for the impaired to receive needed treatment, some civil libertarians
denounced the policy as an unwarranted infringement on individual rights. See
Revolving Door Trap Mentally 1l1, supra note 13, at 22. See also Down and Out-
But Determined, supra note 13, at 29.
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ture or unwarranted. 15
This confusion about into which system a "deviant" person should
be placed is not confined to uninformed lay persons. Professionals in
each system are often equally perplexed and indecisive, and they ac-
tively participate in the cruel game of shuffling some of society's most
vulnerable citizens between two dysfunctional systems.
E. The Merger
The increasing similarity between the mental health and criminal
justice systems can be attributed to several factors. The influx of law-
yers in the mental health system has forced mental health profession-
als to respond. Some have actively resisted this incursion, while
others have appended "forensic" to their titles and become adept at
operating within the criminal justice system. In addition, the growing
number of J.D.-Ph.D. "law psychologists" has infused both systems
with hybrid professionals, many of whom primarily seek to take ad-
vantage of lucrative consulting options in two systems that view each
other as a dumping ground for their respective unreformable and un-
wanted detainees.
Thus, the restructuring of the mental health system in the image
of the criminal justice system, and the cross-fertilization and in-
terchange of professionals in the two systems have created a situation
rife with confusion and conflict. This condition is perhaps best illus-
trated by the shuffling of what are perhaps society's most deviate, the
criminally insane, between the two systems as a result of increasingly
blurred concepts and practices.
Probably since the inception of the insanity defense centuries ago
in England, people have vehemently objected to the verdict "not guilty
by reason of insanity" (NGRI). Jurors have refused the option of
granting NGRI verdicts in famous cases such as those involving the
"Son of Sam,"16 John W. Gacy,17 and England's "Yorkshire Ripper." 18
15. Former merchant seaman Lawrence Singleton raped and hacked off the fore-
arms of a 15-year-old girl in 1979. He was convicted of rape and attempted mur-
der, and sentenced to 14 years and four months. A 1983 California work-incentive
law that reduces sentences by one day for each day spent working as a teacher's
aide in prison classrooms was applied to Singleton, resulting in his early release
and in predictable public outrage. Jones, Early Release Set For Man Who Cut Off
Arms of Girl He Raped, L.A. Times, Oct. 16, 1986, at 3, col. 5.
16. "Son of Sam" is David Berkowitz, sentenced in 1978 to 25 years of life imprison-
ment for each of six slayings, the infamous ".44 caliber killings" in New York
City. Berkowitz was found fit to stand trial although his NGRI plea stated that a
6000-year-old dog told him to kill. Seigel, Berkowitz Given 25 Years To Life In
Each Of 6 "Son of Sam" Slayings, N.Y. Times, June 13, 1978, at 1, col. 5.
17. John W. Gacy, Jr., confessed to the murder of 33 young males found strangled
and buried underneath his house in Des Plaines, Illinois. He was found compe-
tent to stand trial and was convicted in 1980. He is currently on death row. Shep-
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When John Hinckley was found NGRI after shooting President Ron-
ald Reagan in 1981, it was considered an aberration by many who
called for the immediate abolition of the NGRI verdict. Subsequently,
eight states19 created an even more controversial verdict, "guilty but
mentally ill" (GBMI), partially to silence those adamantly opposed to
NGRI verdicts, and partially because no one really knows what to do
with the criminally insane. Such people probably belong in both sys-
tems at different times. Yet, the question of when and why they are
inducted into and released from one or the other system often appears
to be decided with a coin toss. Substance abusers who commit crimes,
child molesters, and those who commit murder using particularly un-
savory methods frequently find themselves in limbo, floating between
the ideologically similar and therapeutically bankrupt mental health
and criminal justice systems.
Another perplexing example of the merger between mental health
and criminal justice is the case of Alvin Ford, who became psychotic
during an eleven-year wait for his execution. The United States
Supreme Court ruled in a divided opinion that executing an incompe-
tent person offends the eighth amendment ban against cruel and unu-
sual punishment.20 With this decision, mental health professionals
acquired the bizarre task of restoring Mr. Ford's competence so that
he could face his executioner.
If one were to predict future trends within and between the two
systems, two scenarios at opposite ends of a continuum seem possible.
Reform, characterized by clear goals, effective methods of treatment
and rehabilitation, rationally based criteria for release, and purposeful
aftercare may occur. However, indifference toward the fate of the cli-
ents of these systems, collusion on the part of the systems' profession-
als to merely keep such clients out of sight and out of the courts, and
greater melding of the systems could result in a system similar to that
allegedly operating in the Soviet Union. There, reportedly, psychiat-
ric diagnoses are often the result of or interchangeable with criminal
convictions. This makes the fate of dissenters, of others who commit
pard, Gacy Is Found Guilty of Killing 33, Record For U.S. Mass Murderer, N.Y.
Times, Mar. 13, 1980, at 1, col. 1.
18. Thirty-five-year-old truck driver Peter Sutcliffe was convicted in Yorkshire, Eng-
land, in 1981 of murdering 13 prostitutes over a period of five years, usually with a
hammer and knife. Sutcliffe stated that he was on a divine mission to kill prosti-
tutes, and received a sentence of life imprisonment for each individual murder.
Rattner, Briton Is Given 13 Life Sentences For The "Yorkshire Ripper"Murders,
N.Y. Times, May 23, 1981, at 6, col. 3.
19. Alaska, 1982; Conn., 1982; Ga., 1982; Ill., 1982-1983; Ind., 1982-1983; Ky., 1982;
N.M., 1982; Mich., 1977. See also Savitsky & Lindblom, The Impact of the Guilty
But Mentally Ill Verdict on Juror Decisions: An Empirical Analysis, 16 J. AP_
PLIED SOC. PSYCHOLOGY 686, 687 (1986).
20. Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986). See also Sargent, Treating the Con-
demned to Death, HASTINGS CENTER REP. 5 (Dec. 1986).
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crimes against the state, and of the mentally ill the same whenever
such dispositions serve the goals of the state.2 '
F. Prospects for Change
Before any meaningful reform can occur in the mental health and
criminal justice systems regarding the most problematic clients the
systems handle, goals and roles must be clarified. As long as forensic
psychologists and psychiatrists and mental health lawyers are willing
to alternately switch their focus as they expediently move between
the systems, confusion and conflict are likely to prevail.
This assertion can be supported by a review of several articles writ-
ten by mental health professionals that reflect an impatience with,
and resistance to, the "overlegalization" of the mental health system.
The press by lawyers for more laws to protect patients' rights also in-
dicates an intermingling or imposition upon the mental health system
by those lawyers. At times, the current situation may appear warlike,
with lawyers and psychologists fighting over turf and autonomy as vig-
orously as over patient rights and care. Phrases from the titles of arti-
cles written by practitioners in both systems, such as "Rotting with
Their Rights On,"22 "Synthetic Sanity,"23 and "Invisible Manacles," 24
all of which discuss the right of mental patients to refuse antipsychotic
medication, reflect cynicism and displeasure. The title of one law re-
view article, "The Right of People (Misfits) to Refuse (Avoid) Treat-
ment (Control) in Medical Facilities (Closed Institutions)," 25 clearly
implies many of this article's assertions about the mental health
system.
Concurrent with this quiet rebellion is another battle front where
mental health professionals are responding to laws passed to protect
not only patient rights, but those of victims as well. A noted psychia-
trist, in discussing the famous Tarasoff case 26 (which led to legislation
mandating a duty of mental health professionals to warn people whose
lives might be threatened by the practitioner's patient-clients), writes
that as a result of that decision a "rising tide" of suits against psycho-
therapists has occurred, and that psychotherapists are seeking protec-
21. See generally A. SOLZHENITSYN, CANCER WARD (N. Sethell & I. Burg trans. 1968).
22. Appelbaum & Gutheil, "Rotting With Their Rights On": Constitutional Theory
and Clinical Reality in Drug Refusal by Psychiatric Patients, 7 BULL. AM. ACAD.
PSYCHIATRY & L. 306 (1979).
23. Gutheil & Appelbaum, "Mind Control," "Synthetic Sanity," "Artificial Compe-
tence" and Genuine Confusion: Legally Relevant Effects of Antipsychotic Medi-
cation, 12 HOFsTRA L. REv. 77 (1983).
24. Plotkin & Gill, Invisible Manacles: Drugging Mentally Retarded People, 31 STAN.
L. REV. 637 (1979).
25. Kaimowitz, 13 DUQ. L. REv. 863 (1975).
26. Tarasoff v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 17 Cal. 3d 425, 551 P.2d 334, 131 Cal. Rptr. 14
(1976).
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tive legislation.27 Six states have enacted laws that are designed to
free psychotherapists of legal liability for a patient's violent act unless
he or she has failed to make a reasonable effort to warn the potential
victim and has failed to notify law-enforcement officials.28
Some responses to this legislation further illustrate how the legali-
zation of the mental health system has affected both practitioners'
procedures and clients within the system at every angle in Figure 1.
For instance, resentment and dismay over the threat of lawsuits,
largely based on the inability of mental health professionals to predict
dangerousness or their alleged misuse of antipsychotic drugs, have re-
sulted in more thorough psychiatric evaluations, and increasing will-
ingness to see involuntary commitment in borderline cases29 (both
affecting potential inductees at angles A' and A 2). To be sure, numer-
ous other changes are occurring, or can be anticipated at all angles as
long as mental health professionals allow lawyers to shape and
reshape their discipline. It is also fair to say that psychologists and
psychiatrists must accept much of the responsibility for the influx of
lawyers into their profession and the subsequent loss of autonomy and
control. Copying a defective criminal justice system or colluding with
the lawyers to maintain a truce is the ultimate "cop-out."
G. Summary
When people are involuntarily brought into and kept within a sys-
tem, someone must be accountable when rights are abridged and
abuses occur. Where those rights are nonexistent or ill-defined, or
when abuses continue unchecked, it is certain that the law will even-
tually intervene. This has been the case with the mental health
system.
Patterns that have been established in the older criminal justice
system are either being copied by practitioners in the mental health
system or they are being imposed upon it by lawyers. There is a blur-
ring of boundary lines between the two systems that is causing harm
to the mental health system and its clients. In fact, the near dysfunc-
tional criminal justice system often encourages the blurring, because
to do so creates a place to dump its most problematic cases, such as the
criminally insane.
There is no "quick fix." However, if mental health professionals
passively abdicate their decisionmaking powers to lawyers, and coop-
erate in the ad hoc relabeling, gratuitous warehousing, and arbitrary
27. Otten, More Psychotherapists Held Liable For the Actions of Violent Patients,
Wall St. J., Mar. 2, 1987, at 21, col. 3.
28. Id.
29. Id.
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deinstitutionalization of society's most deviant people, their system's
collapse is predictable.
III. THE JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM
As in the mental health system, the past quarter century has seen
an increasing legalization of the juvenile justice system and a corre-
sponding decline in confidence in the results of that system. The same
trends noted in the contemporary mental health system-greater
rights at induction and after confinement; confusion over rehabilita-
tion, the system's primary treatment goal; "dumping" and shuffling
from one system to another; and merger with the criminal justice sys-
tem-are apparent in juvenile justice.
FIGURE II
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A. Legal Rights at Intake in the Juvenile Justice System (Angle A3)30
Prior to 1967, induction of children into the juvenile justice system
was an informal matter. In re Gault33 of course changed that, opening
the way for Supreme Court recognition of several trial-type rights at
adjudicatory hearings: rights to notice, to counsel, to confrontation of
opposing witnesses, and the privilege against self-incrimination in
Gault; proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt in In re Winship 32;
protection against double jeopardy in Breed v. Jones33; and freedom
from unreasonable searches and seizures in New Jersey v. TL.O.34 A
few lower courts have accorded juveniles the rights to bail35 and to a
public trial.36 Statutes and court rules have gone much farther in cre-
ating rights, 37 so that at present the rules of procedure applicable in
juvenile court read much like those applicable in criminal courts.
Another important aspect of the legalization of intake in the juve-
nile justice system has been the contraction of the juvenile court's ju-
risdiction. In its initial inception, the juvenile court had jurisdiction to
hear all allegations of misconduct, criminal and noncriminal. Since
Gault, the court's noncriminal jurisdiction--consisting largely of
claims of "incorrigibility" and "truancy"-has been attacked on all
fronts. There have been numerous court challenges,38 and in 1977 the
prestigious Juvenile Justice Standards Project recommended jettison-
ing jurisdiction over noncriminal misbehavior.39 Though most states
still retain this jurisdictional category, it is invoked far less frequently
today than twenty years ago, and it seldom results in incarceration.
Even diversion, the process of informal probation that once was the
dominant response to juvenile misconduct, has become the subject of
legal regulation. Led once again by the Juvenile Justice Standards
30. This section relies heavily upon W. WADLINGTON, C. WHITEBREAD & S. DAVIS,
CASES AND MATERIALS ON CHILDREN IN THE LEGAL SYSTEM (1983).
31. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
32. 397 U.S. 358 (1970). But cf McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528 (1971) (no
right to trial by jury in juvenile court).
33. 421 U.S. 519 (1975). But see Swisher v. Brady, 438 U.S. 204 (1978).
34. 469 U.S. 325 (1985).
35. See, e.g., Trimble v. Stone, 187 F. Supp. 483 (D.D.C. 1960). But see Schall v. Mar-
tin, 467 U.S. 253 (1984).
36. See, e.g., RLR v. State, 487 P.2d 27 (Alaska 1971).
37. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. §§ 39.02-.337 (1987); FLA. R. Juv. P. 8.010-.330.
38. See, e.g., Lamb v. Brown, 456 F.2d 18 (10th Cir. 1972); District of Columbia v.
B.J.R., 332 A.2d 58 (D.C. 1975); Commonwealth v. Brasher, 359 Mass. 550, 270
N.E.2d 389 (1971); A. v. City of New York, 31 N.Y.2d 83, 286 N.E.2d 432, 335
N.Y.S.2d 33 (1972); In re Walker, 282 N.C. 28,191 S.E.2d 702 (1972); E.S.G. v. State,
447 S.W.2d 225 (Tex. Civ. App. 1969).
39. STANDARDS RELATING TO NONCRIMINAL MISBEHAVIOR 1.1 (Juvenile Justice Stan-
dards Project, Tent. Draft 1977).
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Project,40 many states have adopted detailed regulations regarding
who may be diverted from the juvenile court, as well as when and how
diversion is to take place.41 There could be no clearer demonstration
of how much the spirit of legalization has penetrated the intake stage
of the juvenile justice system.
B. Legal Rights During Juvenile Incarceration (A3 to B3)
As the assertion of "prisoners' rights" and treatment rights has
transformed the mental health system, so has the claim of similar
rights by incarcerated juveniles changed the juvenile justice system.
Courts have recognized that children held in long-term juvenile facili-
ties may assert the eighth amendment's limitation on cruel and unu-
sual punishment, as well as other constitutional rights applicable to
prisoners.42 Juveniles have also successfully used the juvenile court's
dedication to rehabilitation to derive an enforceable right to treatment
in juvenile facilities.
The constitutional ban on cruel and unusual punishment has been
applied to juvenile incarceration, 43 opening the way for challenges to
conditions of imprisonment and forms of punishment.44 Most inter-
estingly for those intrigued by the comparison of the criminal, mental
health, and juvenile systems, some courts have recognized the incar-
cerated juvenile's right to resist forced medication.45 Besides showing
the parallels among criminal, civil, and juvenile commitment, this
legal development also produces the anomaly of enforceable rights
both to obtain treatment and to avoid it.
The source of this right to treatment is the juvenile justice system's
articulated commitment to rehabilitation. Originally conceived as a
quid pro quo for reduced rights in the adjudicatory process, 46 after
Gault the right to treatment has been more frequently justified as a
40. STANDARDS RELATING TO THE JUVENILE PROBATION FUNCTION 2.4 (Juvenile Jus-
tice Standards Project, Official Draft 1980).
41. See, e.g., H. THOMPSON, CALIFORNIA JUVENILE COURT DESKBOOK ch. 4 (2d ed.
1981), excerpted in W. WADLINGTON, C. WHITEBREAD & S. DAVIS, supra note 30,
at 342-45.
42. Regarding constitutional rights of incarcerated juveniles in addition to the eighth
amendment, see Silbert & Sussman, The Rights of Juveniles Confined in Train-
ing School and the Experience of a Training School Ombudsman, 40 BROOKLYN
L. REV. 605 (1974).
43. See, e.g., Nelson v. Heyne, 491 F.2d 352 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 976
(1974).
44. See, e.g., Milonas v. Williams, 691 F.2d 931 (10th Cir. 1982), cert denied, 460 U.S.
1069 (1983)(disapproving practices at private school, attendance at which was
made a condition of juvenile probation).
45. See Nelson v. Heyne, 491 F.2d 352, 356-57 (7th Cir. 1974), cert denied, 417 U.S. 976
(1974).
46. See Ketcham, The UnfuWlled Promise of the Juvenile Court, 7 CRIME & DELINQ.
97, 100-01 (1961).
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way of forcing the state to live up to its commitments. 47 Under right-
to-treatment analysis, however conceived, courts may focus on partic-
ular treatment modalities or on results; in either case, assessments
may be made both individually and among inmates as a whole.48
The assertion of legal rights after commitment is an established
feature of juvenile justice, which has thus joined the mental health
system in mimicking criminal justice. The role of the rehabilitative
ideal in this process is ironic, because the juvenile justice system seems
to be losing faith in this goal just as it is bearing its most significant
fruit, the right to treatment.
C. Controversy over the Goal of Juvenile Justice (Angle B')
Designed to protect the welfare of children who are considered im-
mature, malleable, and deserving of a second chance, rehabilitation of
juvenild offenders was the original animating goal of the juvenile jus-
tice movement,49 and verbal commitment to this goal continues today
in many quarters. However, among legal theorists there is a crisis of
confidence in the rehabilitative ideal, which could well foreshadow a
systemwide collapse of faith. Again, such a collapse would parallel
similar developments in the criminal justice and mental health
systems.
Two basic challenges have emerged to rehabilitation as the ration-
ale for a separate system of juvenile justice. Among those who con-
tinue to believe that children's interests should predominate in the
treatment of juvenile misconduct, there has grown a fear that the ju-
venile justice system does more harm than good. The prescription of
these critics is best summarized in the title of one of the more influen-
tial works in this vein: Radical Non-Intervention.50 The burden of
this criticism is that misguided attempts at rehabilitation should be
discontinued in favor of benign neglect; the abandonment of the juve-
nile court's noncriminal jurisdiction and the juvenile deinstitutional-
ization movement 51 are both outgrowths of this criticism.
The second form of dissent from the rehabilitative ideal takes its
lead from society's interest in controlling juvenile misconduct. These
critics argue that deterrence is the highest priority of any system of
47. See, e.g., Morgan v. Sproat, 432 F. Supp. 1130 (S.D. Miss. 1977); Martarella v. Kel-
ley, 349 F. Supp. 575 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
48. See, e.g., Nelson v. Heyne, 491 F.2d 352, 360 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 417 U.S.
976 (1974).
49. See Mack, The Juvenile Court, 23 HARV. L. REv. 104 (1909). See also LEGAL
RIGHTS OF CHILDREN § 11.01 (R. Horowitz & H. Davidson eds. 1984).
50. E. SCHUR, RADICAL NON-INTERVENTION: RETHINKING THE DELINQUENCY PROB-
LEM (1973).
51. See supra text accompanying notes 38-39 and infra text accompanying notes 55-
57.
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behavior control, and that accordingly the juvenile justice system
must impose sanctions on young offenders first and seek rehabilitation
only as a secondary matter.52 This view, which eradicates one of the
major distinctions between the criminal and juvenile justice systems,
was adopted by the Juvenile Justice Standards Project, over strenuous
objections.5 3 One of the main manifestations of this view is the Stan-
dards Project's recommendation that relatively determinate sentences
be established for juvenile misconduct, instead of the open-ended dis-
positions common in most jurisdictions.54
Though neither of these critiques of rehabilitation has had a thor-
oughgoing impact on juvenile law, their popularity among theorists
suggests that in due course skepticism about rehabilitation will re-
write the statutes and rules defining the juvenile justice system.
When this occurs, perhaps some will say that the law was only catch-
ing up with the skepticism currently reflected in the day-to-day reali-
ties of juvenile court.
D. Dumping (Angle C3) and Shuffling (A---C 3-A 3 or A' or A2; or
A3---A' or A2) in the Juvenile Justice System
One of the more disheartening aspects of reality in the juvenile
justice system is the fate of those who fail the project of rehabilitation.
Prematurely deprived of the benefits of available treatment, releasees
frequently end up back in the juvenile system or graduate to the crim-
inal courts or, more rarely, to the process of civil commitment. In
some cases, this movement to another system is aided by special juve-
nile court procedures for intersystem transfer.
Like the mental health system, juvenile justice has recently weath-
ered a deinstitutionalization movement. Many jurisdictions have sig-
nificantly lowered the number of incarcerated juveniles, and a few
have gone so far as to abandon statewide institutions in favor of com-
munity-based programs.55 While this development has obviously ben-
efited many juveniles,56 it has also resulted just as clearly in the
premature return to society of some who might have profited from
further treatment in an institutional setting. Such juveniles have be-
come prime candidates for recidivism, in either juvenile or criminal
court; others have found their way into the mental health system,
either as children5 7 or later as adults.
52. STANDARDS RELATING TO DISPOSITIONS 1.1 commentary (Juvenile Justice Stan-
dards Project, Official Draft 1980).
53. Id.; see also id. at 133-35.
54. Id. at 1.2F commentary.
55. See, e.g., R. COATES, A. MILLER & L. OHLIN, DIVERSITY IN A YOUTH CORREC-
TIONAL SYSTEM: HANDLING DELINQUENTS IN MASSACHUSETTS (1978).
56. Id. at 176-78.
57. See infra text accompanying notes 65-67, 70-78.
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Special procedures available in juvenile court frequently accelerate
this shuffling between systems. Almost all states have provisions for
waiver of juvenile court jurisdiction and transfer to criminal court; the
usual bottom-line standard for transfer is nonamenability to the treat-
ment available in juvenile court.58 Thus the central question in a
transfer hearing is whether the subject of the inquiry "belongs" in the
juvenile justice system-a question that increases the potential for
dumping one system's mistakes into another.
Of course, the criminal justice system could be only a brief stop for
the transferred juvenile, who may be quickly forwarded to the mental
health system. The recommendations of the Juvenile Justice Stan-
dards Project exemplify one way in which this movement might begin.
The standards specifically indicate that in making the transfer deci-
sion, the juvenile court may consider "the appropriateness of the serv-
ices and dispositional alternatives available in the criminal justice
system for dealing with the juvenile's problems."59 Because criminal
courts trequently have access to more diverse treatment alternatives
for thoge with mental problems, the Project's recommendation could
result ih a pass through the criminal system for juveniles deemed to
fall in this category.60
Like adjudicatory hearings, transfer proceedings have been sub-
jecte.d to extensive legal regulation, beginning with the United States
Supreme Court's opinion in Kent v. United States,61 which predated
Gault. The careful attention that reviewing courts have given to legal
rights in transfer proceedings6 2 contrasts starkly with the relatively
open-ended nonamenability standard, which has received much less
judicial scrutiny. Transfer proceedings thus display in microcosm
what has happened throughout juvenile justice (and the other systems
for behavior control): legalization of procedures has masked the un-
derlying reality of declining effectiveness.
E. Merger with the Criminal Justice System
In its original design the juvenile justice system aimed to save chil-
dren from the depredations inherent in exposure to the criminal jus-
tice system.63 The contemporary reality of juvenile justice is that it,
58. See generally STANDARDS RELATING TO TRANSFER BETWEEN COURTS 2.2 com-
mentary (Juvenile Justice Standards Project, Official Draft 1980).
59. Id. at 2.2C.4.
60. Of course, the juvenile court may also refer juveniles directly to the mental
health system. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 39.08(2) (1987).
61. 383 U.S. 541 (1966).
62. See W. WADLINGTON, C. WHITEBREAD & S. DAVIS, supra note 30, at 393-401 (dis-
cussing counsel, notice, evidentiary issues, standard of proof, self-incrimination,
statement of reasons, and appeal).
63. See generally Mack, supra note 49; LEGAL RIGHTS OF CHILDREN, supra note 49,
§ 11.01, at 463-65.
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like the mental health system, mimics criminal justice in virtually
every phase. What was designed to be different has become strikingly
similar, and the chance to achieve significantly different results has
accordingly been lost.
A good symbol of this merger of the two systems and the confusion
it produces is the current controversy over executing juveniles.
Transferred to criminal court before being sentenced to death, these
juveniles are thus officially adults, yet the courts cannot blind them-
selves to the fact that chronologically the capital defendants before
them are still juveniles. If the juvenile court was truly a different,
genuinely effective system, the transfer to criminal court could be
meaningful. But because the systems are not significantly different,
and because the transfer may say more about the exigencies of system
management and law enforcement than about the defendant's amena-
bility to treatment as a juvenile, some courts have balked at execution.
In its most recent decision on this issue, it is clear that a majority of
the United States Supreme Court has not yet sorted out these conflict-
ing attitudes.6 4
Another example of merger concerns the impact of mental disease
or defect on a juvenile court proceeding; this example also brings the
mental health system into play, disclosing the merger of all three sys-
tems. When juveniles began asserting the insanity defense in adjudi-
catory proceedings, the courts' initial response was that the defense
was not available in juvenile court and that mental disease or defect
could be taken into account only at the dispositional stage;65 the differ-
ent goals and methods of the juvenile court arguably justified this re-
sult. However, the trend of more recent decisions has been to allow
the defense at the adjudicatory stage.66 While conforming to putative
constitutional requirements derived from the criminal justice model,67
these decisions effectively remove the children involved from the ju-
venile justice system, leaving only the mental health system to deal
with them.68 Thus mimickry of criminal justice has made the juvenile
court less effective and accordingly has placed a greater burden on the
mental health system.
F. Summary
The original philosophy of the juvenile justice system, protecting
malleable youth from the harsh realities of the criminal justice system
64. Thompson v. Oklahoma, 108 S. Ct. 2687 (1988).
65. See, e.g., In re State ex reL H.C., 106 N.J. Super. 583, 256 A.2d 322 (1969).
66. See, e.g., In re State ex reL Causey, 363 So. 2d 472 (La. 1978).
67. See id. at 473-75.
68. The same result occurs when juveniles assert that they are mentally incompetent
to stand trial, see id, or that they lacked mens rea because of mental disease or
defect. Cf. In re C.W.M., 407 A.2d 617 (D.C. 1979) (disallowing the claim).
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in order to give them a fresh start, was sound. However, the will to
create an effective system was lacking, and abuse and neglect of those
in the system ensued, leading to legalization.
Now, an increasingly dysfunctional juvenile justice system is in cri-
sis, because it does not serve troubled juveniles but instead fosters
their aimless wanderings within and among the juvenile, criminal, and
mental health systems. Concurrently, whatever malleability these
juveniles once possessed is being transformed for many into indiffer-
ence, anger, and contempt directed toward the people, communities,
and society that have betrayed them.69
IV. JUVENILES IN THE MENTAL HEALTH SYSTEM
In the adult mental health and juvenile justice systems, the process
of legalization is already substantially complete, and the primary issue
is how to deal with the system that has resulted from this process.
Regarding the mental health response to juveniles, however, legaliza-
tion is still in its nascent stages. This fact provides both a potential for
charting new developments in this area and an opportunity to manage
those developments based on what has been learned from the previous
legalization of other systems.
A. Commitment of Juveniles to Mental Health Facilities (Angle A4)
While children considered difficult were treated at home without
the aid of professional help fifty years ago, today's solution to such
problem children appears to be the use of short- and long-term institu-
tionalization in psychiatric hospitals. Such children are usually con-
sidered to be emotionally distraught by mental health professionals as
evidenced by belligerence at home, truancy, running away, and disre-
gard for commonly accepted rules. But these children usually do not
evidence any severe psychotic disturbance, nor are they a danger to
themselves or others. In the past such behavior was merely consid-
ered to be due to family difficulties or part of the child's growing
struggle for autonomy, because the difficulties centered around issues
with parents. Hospitalization of these children is usually against their
wishes and focuses upon the child as the sole problem, rather than
identifying the family difficulties that precipitated the child's behavior
and seeking to resolve them.
A number of factors can be identified which have directly or indi-
rectly led to the use of hospitalization to control unruly children.
Chief among these factors is the deinstitutionalization of the juvenile
69. For a related discussion of the failure of these systems to serve impaired and
troubled juveniles, see Garcia & Steele, Mentally Retarded Offenders in the
Criminal Justice and Mental Retardation Services Systems in 1lorida Philo-
sophical, Placement, and Treatment Issues, 41 ARK. L. REV. 809 (1988).
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justice system. Also relevant are insurance coverage that emphasizes
traditional inpatient care and competition among hospitals to fill ever-
increasing numbers of beds.
Until 1974, minors who committed status offenses, acts which were
deemed illegal solely due to the age of the offender, were confined in
juvenile detention and correction facilities for treatment. With the
enactment of the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act of
1974,70 however, yearly commitment of minors to correctional facili-
ties decreased nationally by approximately 78,000 youths from 1974 to
1979.71 As the role of the justice system in dealing with such problem
children has decreased, a growing number of parents have been faced
with acquiring alternative sources of assistance for dealing with
problems they believe are beyond their ability to control.
A secondary factor that appears to be contributing to the increased
hospitalization of children are current insurance practices. Generally,
third-party health care providers have favored inpatient over outpa-
tient treatment,72 with coverage estimates ranging from eighty to one
hundred percent for inpatient services as compared to fifty percent for
outpatient services. Thus, when families are experiencing turmoil fo-
cused upon a child who is a behavior problem, they are more likely to
have him or her admitted to a hospital because of financial reasons.
The growth of the psychiatric care market is another secondary
factor. Several developments in the field have led to an increase in
competition among psychiatric facilities.73 Central to this competition
is the increase in private psychiatric hospitals because they are such
good investments. As the supply of hospital beds has exceeded the
public demand for them, competition among hospitals to fill those
beds has increased. Presently, nearly all forms of media contain ad-
vertisements that encourage people to seek help for emotional diffi-
culties, and many appear to be targeting parents who are frustrated
with coping with their difficult children.
The end result of such forces has been parents having their chil-
dren admitted to inpatient facilities, to provide some sense of relief at
home and to get the child into treatment. One article on recent trends
in treatment of minors in inpatient facilities estimated a growth from
6,420 juveniles admitted in 1971 to 35,656 in 1986. 74 Other estimates of
the growth in juvenile inpatient psychiatric care have arrived at a fig-
70. 42 U.S.C. §§ 5601-5751 (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
71. Krisberg & Schwartz, Rethinking Juvenile Justice, 29 CRIME & DELINQ. 333, 342
(1983).
72. Mosher, Alternatives to Psychiatric Hospitalization: Why Has Research Failed
To Be Translated Into Practice?, 309 N. ENG. J. MED. 1579 (1983).
73. R. Lowman, Economic Incentives in the Delivery of Alternative Mental Health
Services (Aug. 1987) (unpublished paper presented at the annual meeting of the
American Psychological Association).
74. Jackson-Beeck, Schwartz & Rutherford, Trends and Issues in Juvenile Confine-
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ure of a 400 percent increase over the years from 1980 to 1985.75 In
1980 approximately one-half of juvenile admissions were given diagno-
ses consistent with relatively mild psychopathology, such as adjust-
ment reactions, conduct disorders, and hyperactivity.76 The bottom
line of this trend in psychiatric treatment is that "48,000 kids in this
country are working out their troubled adolescent years behind locked
doors instead of weathering the storm at home as most of their par-
ents did."77
What has enabled this growth in hospitalization of children are
statutory differences between how children and adults enter inpatient
facilities. While the laws vary to a considerable degree among the
states, the procedures are quite similar.
"Involuntary commitment," the process of confining individuals to
a treatment facility against their will due to the severity of their
mental impairment or their dangerousness, involves a number of pro-
cedural safeguards such as a precommitment hearing and regular re-
view to insure the due process rights of the individual. "Voluntary
admission" involves individuals entering inpatient treatment on the
basis of having provided their full and informed consent for such
treatment. This latter procedure carries with it relatively few safe-
guards because it is assumed that the individual can demand release
from the facility if dissatisfied with the treatment.
The primary difference between the entry of children and adults
into such facilities lies in the case of parents who choose to have their
children enter inpatient treatment against the wishes of the children.
While some limitations have been placed upon such procedures, the
majority of the states consider this to be a voluntary admission and
subject to almost no regulation. 78 Parents bring their child to the
treatment facility, where the family is interviewed by several levels of
hospital staff, from admissions personnel to social workers to physi-
cians. This interview is designed to assess the treatment needs of the
child, and recommendations are made to the family. At the conclusion
of this procedure, the parents may choose to sign a petition for the
admission and treatment of the child at the facility, regardless of the
child's preferences.
ment for Psychiatric and Chemical Dependency Treatment, 10 INT'L J.L. & PsY-
CHIATRY 153 (1987).
75. Breckenridge, The Dangers in Hospitalizing Mildly Mentally Ill Youngsters,
Tampa Tribune, Sept. 3, 1987, at 14-A, col. 1; Ostroff, Growing Up Behind Locked
Doors: A Look Inside America's Hidden System of Teen Control, Rolling Stone,
Nov. 20, 1986, at 70, 72.
76. Jackson-Beeck, Schwartz & Rutherford, supra note 74, at 156.
77. Ostroff, supra note 75, at 72.
78. Beyer & Wilson, The Reluctant Volunteer: A Child's Right to Resist Commitment,
in CHILDREN'S RIGHTS AND THE MENTAL HEALTH PROFESSIONS 133 (G. Koocher
ed. 1976).
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This procedure would appear to be quite functional in cases where
the parties involved in the intake process have as their primary con-
cern the best interests of the child. Unfortunately, this may not be the
case in a large portion of admissions, considering the previously de-
scribed need for hospitals to fill existing beds and the likelihood of the
child's problems being familial in nature.
B. Incipient Legalization at Angle A4
After a number of lower court decisions had provided some legal
protection to minors committed by their parents, the United States
Supreme Court found a typically lax statute regarding procedures for
voluntary admission of minors to be constitutional. But subsequent
legislation enacted in a number of states has begun to provide more
procedural protection for committed juveniles.
In one of the first court cases to examine a parent's right to have a
minor admitted to a psychiatric hospital, Hewellette v. George,79 Sallie
Hewellette filed a suit for wrongful imprisonment against her mother
and then, upon her mother's death, against her mother's estate. Miss
Hewellette, although still a minor, was married but separated from
her husband at the time her mother had her voluntarily committed.
The Supreme Court of Mississippi concluded that the relationship of a
parent to a minor child should create reciprocal immunity to torts, in
order to maintain peace within families. While the nature of the par-
ent-child relationship was uncertain, due to Miss Hewellette's mar-
riage, the court nevertheless reversed a lower court decision in Miss
Hewellette's favor. Hewellette has since become precedent for tort im-
munity between parents and minor children in suits regarding the
confinement of children in psychiatric hospitals against their will. Al-
ternative attacks on admissions procedures by challenging the struc-
ture and constitutionality of the statutes involved have met with more
success.
Melville v. Sabbatino8o involved an adolescent, Cameron Melville,
who had been admitted to the Yale Psychiatric Institute in Connecti-
cut at the request of his parents when he was fifteen years old. Fol-
lowing two years of confinement in the institution, Cameron
requested in writing that he be released from the facility, but his re-
quest was refused by hospital personnel and his parents, at which time
he applied for a writ of habeas corpus to secure his release. While he
acknowledged his need for treatment, he also believed that he would
benefit most from outpatient treatment. The Superior Court of Con-
necticut, after discussing relevant statutes, held that minors of age six-
79. 68 Miss. 703, 9 So. 885 (1891).
80. 30 Conn. Supp. 320, 313 A.2d 886 (Super. Ct. 1973).
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teen years or greater have the rights of a voluntary patient, which
include the right to request release after appropriate notification.
This case neither took issue with the initial admission procedures
nor did it challenge the constitutionality of the statute regulating such
admissions. The focus of examination was the statutory right of mi-
nors age sixteen and older to act in their own behalf as voluntary
patients.
Another case, Pyle v. Brooks,81 attempted to challenge the consti-
tutionality of the Oregon statutes governing the admission of minors
to state hospitals. In 1975, Wade Henry Pyle was committed to the
Oregon State Hospital by his mother against his wishes. Approxi-
mately six months later, the minor applied for a writ of habeas corpus,
claiming that the statutes under which he was committed violated his
right to due process. The Court of Appeals of Oregon, in examining
the relevant statutes, found them to be incomplete and therefore void-
able upon challenge, but refused to comment upon the constitutional-
ity of these statutes.
A similar case in California, In re Roger S.,82 asserted that the Cali-
fornia statute regarding voluntary admission of minors to inpatient
psychiatric facilities violated the committed minor's due process
rights. Roger S. was fourteen years old when he was admitted to a
state hospital at the request of his mother. The Supreme Court of Cal-
ifornia found that the statutes involved did violate due process rights
and held that the parents of minors age fourteen years or more could
not waive the due process rights of the minor. The court also held that
minors fourteen years or older were entitled to a precommitment
hearing before a neutral factfinder when they disagreed with their
parents regarding the necessity of inpatient treatment.
From these cases one can observe a growing concern with the pro-
cedural safeguards afforded children whose parents wish to have them
admitted for inpatient psychiatric treatment. Thus it seemed to be
quite appropriate when the United States Supreme Court granted cer-
tiorari to a similar case. In Parham v. J.R.,83 two children, J.R. and
J.L., were inpatients in a Georgia state mental hospital who filed a
class action suit against officials of the Georgia Department of Human
Resources and the chief medical officer of the state hospital. J.R. and
J.L. were admitted to the state hospital at the ages of six and seven
years, respectively, and both were considered to be incorrigible. J.L.
was admitted following the request of his mother, while J.R., a ward
of the state, was admitted by the Georgia Department of Family and
Children Services.
81. 31 Or. App. 479, 570 P.2d 990 (Ct. App. 1977).
82. 19 Cal. 3d 921, 569 P.2d 1286, 141 Cal. Rptr. 298 (1977).
83. 442 U.S. 584 (1979).
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The minors challenged the Georgia statutes for voluntary commit-
ment of children on the grounds that they violated the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment. The statutes provide for the vol-
untary admission of minors age eighteen years and younger at the re-
quest of the minor's parent or guardian. When parents apply for the
admission of their children, the hospital superintendent has the au-
thority to temporarily admit any child for observation, diagnosis, and
treatment, if necessary.
While the district court initially found the statutes to be in viola-
tion of due process, the Supreme Court reversed that decision. Having
reviewed the existing procedures, the Court believed that they pro-
vided minimally adequate protection of due process rights such as ini-
tial evaluation by a neutral party, the superintendent, while avoiding
excessive procedural burdens. More specifically, the Court held that
parents should maintain the authority for seeking inpatient treatment
for their children because parents in most cases act in the best interest
of their children. The Court also stated that since a neutral party, the
hospital superintendent, must also agree to the voluntary admission of
the child, adequate protection existed for cases where the parents are
not acting in the best interest of the child.
In a second case reaching the Supreme Court, Secretary of Public
Welfare v. Institutionalized Juveniles,84 similar challenges were
made to the Pennsylvania statutes governing voluntary commitment
of children. Here, the Court merely reiterated its opinion from
Parham v. JR. and stated that the Pennsylvania procedures also pro-
vided adequate protection of the due process rights of children.
Thus, at present, children cannot seek recourse against their par-
ents for commitment against their wishes, due to parent-child tort im-
munity, and the statutes controlling voluntary commitment of
children have been found to contain adequate protection of due pro-
cess as guaranteed in the Constitution. While the battle in the courts
for protection of children's precommitment rights appears to have
been lost, considerable success has been achieved in the legislatures.
Approximately two-thirds of the states currently provide some form
of significant protection, either by prohibiting or severely restricting
the voluntary admission of children by parents. These limitations in-
clude age limitations, a precommitment hearing if the minor objects,
and restrictions on the duration of hospitalization85
C. Prospects for Further Legalization at Angle A4
Judicial and legislative movement in the area of commitment pro-
84. 442 U.S. 640 (1979).
85. Zenoff & Zients, If Civil Commitment Is The Answer For Children, What Are
The Questions?, 51 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 171, 191 (1983).
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cedures appears to have provided at least minimal assurance of due
process for minors. However, the combination of parents faced with
finding some means of coping with their children, insurance coverage
favoring inpatient treatment, and hospital competition to fill existing
beds inevitably will result in the location and abuse of any loopholes
available in the procedures. Thus, for reformers, it is imperative that
these statutes and accompanying procedures be scrutinized to afford
the maximum protection of the rights of these children.
In 1974, Professor James W. Ellis first wrote about the abuse of the
procedures for voluntary admission of children by their parents.8 6
While some judicial and legislative changes have taken place since his
initial review of the system, many of the same weaknesses still exist.
Thus, many of his proposals are still pertinent. Two of the primary
ways fdr safeguarding due process suggested by Ellis were either a
precommitment hearing or delayed commitment hearing. While the
former would complicate current procedures, the latter would merely
limit the duration of a dissenting child's hospitalization and provide
him or her with a means of seeking release. Inserting the hearing af-
ter admission would appear to avoid complicating the admission pro-
cess while still ensuring at least some due process rights for these
children and providing some additional check on the motives of hospi-
tal personnel and parents.
Ellis also suggested the need for a standard for commitment be-
yond simply limiting admission to those children who "need treat-
ment." Similar criteria for adults have included the inability to care
for oneself or dangerousness to self or others. While these may be too
restrictive to apply to childhood admissions, some intermediate defini-
tion could be developed. By defining specific criteria for admission,
individuals in need of treatment would be detected more easily and
those for whom inpatient treatment was not appropriate, such as sta-
tus offenders, would have to be referred elsewhere.
Ellis also proposed the adoption of procedures through which chil-
dren who were voluntarily admitted by their parents could seek re-
lease. He suggested that children be afforded the right to request
release, at which time if the parents or hospital disagreed, a hearing
could be held to determine whether continued treatment was
necessary.
A related issue, case review, could also serve to protect the due
process rights of children. Professor Zenoff and Dr. Zients8 7 noted
that while the Supreme Court did emphasize the need for review in
Parham v. JR., the Court failed to stipulate any required frequency
for review, thus nullifying its intentions due to the vagueness of its
86. Ellis, Volunteering Children: Parental Commitment of Minors To Mental Insti-
tutions, 62 CALIF. L. REV. 840 (1974).
87. Zenoff & Zients, supra note 85, at 190.
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recommendations. Such procedures could be defined by law to avoid
their abuse. Coupled with a child's right to seek release, these proce-
dures would prohibit unnecessarily long hospitalization.
Perhaps one of the most important ways to ensure due process for
children is by increasing their awareness of their rights. Children
could be made aware of their rights upon admission in language they
could easily understand. Additionally, Zenoff and Zients have recom-
mended that children have access to legal counsel either from attor-
neys or law students. The awareness of their rights and access to
counsel would provide children with a means of actively protecting
their own interests.
D. Prospects for Treatment Rights (A4 -- B4)
In a proposal for a model law for commitment of children, Profes-
sor Gary B. Melton8s has emphasized the need for a continuum of
treatment settings, ranging in restrictiveness from outpatient treat-
ment to partial hospitalization to full inpatient treatment. Develop-
ment and maintenance of such alternative treatments could be seen as
essential for proper placement of children in the environment best
suited to their needs.
While a child's right to treatment has yet to be decided by the
courts, legislative modifications could make such treatment available.
Ellis has suggested that at least older children be given the right to
seek treatment on their own behalf regardless of the wishes of their
parents. He emphasized, however, that such decisionmaking should
be conducted with the full knowledge of the alternatives available.
This would provide children in neglectful and abusive homes with
some means of seeking help for their problems even if their parents
object. Here again, however, the mental health system is inadequate,
and children and their families will have to begin to turn to the legal
system to acquire treatment rights and protections.
It is abundantly clear from current reports that juveniles in the
mental health system are frequently overmedicated, sometimes physi-
cally abused, allegedly brainwashed, and otherwise mistreated in vari-
ous types of treatment programs.8 9 Without a doubt, laws will be
passed, and cases will be argued and won that will create a set of rights
in the area of treatment for children. The legalization will press on
88. Telephone conversation with Gary B. Melton, Carl Adolph Happold Professor of
Psychology and Law, University of Nebraska-Lincoln, to Richard E. Spana (Dec.
3, 1987).
89. See generally Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 628 (1979) (Brennan, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part)(citing Wheeler v. Glass, 473 F.2d 983 (7th Cir. 1973));
New York State Ass'n for Retarded Children v. Rockefeller, 357 F. Supp. 752
(E.D.N.Y. 1973); Wyatt v. Stickney, 344 F. Supp. 387 (M.D. Ala. 1972), aff'd sub
nom. Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974).
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once the issue of release and recidivism catches the attention of
enough mental health lawyers.
E. The Future of the Juvenile Mental Health System
Some of the most pervasive problems plaguing juveniles are sub-
stance abuse, eating disorders, suicide, delinquency, depression, and
school-related problems such as underachievement. Despite the vast
differences in the causes of these behavioral and mental problems of
childhood and adolescence, it is conceivable that youth seeking help
for all of these problems could be labeled "mentally ill" and commit-
ted to the same "treatment" program.
Such mislabeling and defective placement might happen for sev-
eral reasons, some of which have been discussed previously. Person-
nel who first come into contact with troubled youth, such as those
within the school systems and law enforcement agencies, may lack the
training to distinguish between the manifestations of mental illness
and other behaviors that might be nonconforming but that do not indi-
cate mental illness. That some of these mislabeled juveniles are
wrongfully committed to mental institutions is also the product of pa-
rental willingess to abandon their "problem" children and of the need
to fill vacant psychiatric beds.
Perhaps key to this mistreatment of juveniles is the fact that the
definition of mental illness that has occurred in the "adult" mental
health system has not occurred for juveniles. Statutes have defined
mental illness and provided criteria for commitment to mental health
facilities. However, even with the best of such statutes, their effective-
ness for juveniles is suspect, not because the acts are faulty, but be-
cause they have not been defined specifically to respond to the needs
of juveniles, and because the very refinements in definition that the
laws do make are not observed. For instance, the Florida Mental
Health Act defines mental illness as:
an impairment of the emotional processes, of the ability to exercise conscious
control of one's actions, or of the ability to perceive reality or to understand,
which impairment substantially interferes with a person's ability to meet the
ordinary demands of living, regardless of etiology; except that for the purpose
of this act, the term does not include retardation or developmental disabil-
ity.. .. simple intoxication, or conditions manifested only by antisocial behav-
ior or drug addiction.90
The definition of mental illness in the first part of this provision seems
straightforward enough to apply effectively to juveniles. It is those
who should fall in the exceptions, however-the slow learner; the
drunken juvenile who is acting out; the "incorrigible," defiant, or re-
peat runaway; the chronic truant; and the youth "tripped out" on
drugs-who end up committed to mental institutions in violation of
90. FLA. STAT. § 394.455(3) (1987).
1989]
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
statutes like the Florida act. Moreover, the abuse is magnified when
the treatment facility is totally unprepared to help these juveniles,
particularly those who have been committed against their will and
who consciously or unconsciously resist whatever help is offered.
It appears as though one of two processes will inevitably take place:
1) there will emerge a juvenile mental health system that abides by
the mandates of existing laws in a way that specifically serves the
needs of juveniles, including diagnosis, placement, and treatment; this
would, of necessity, require the system to address the needs of those
groups excepted under statutes like the Florida act; or 2) practitioners'
misdiagnoses, improper placement, and ill-treatment or nontreatment
will continue both for mentally ill juveniles and for those improperly
labeled as mentally ill. As demonstrated above, this second outcome
will eventually produce the legalization of the system, to protect
juveniles' commitment and treatment rights and their rights following
deinstitutionalization.
F. Summary
These best and worst scenarios, similar to the ones advanced for
the adult mental health system, might seem a simple choice for well-
meaning mental health practitioners. However, choosing the first op-
tion is fraught with problems of interpretation of definitions, attitudes
toward mental illness, inadequate funding for facilities, the phenome-
non of "throwaway" kids (forced to leave home because parents are
fed up with them), and the societal indifference that has produced few
visible advocates for the rights of troubled juveniles. If mental health
practitioners are unable to create a workable juvenile mental health
system and they leave it to the legislatures and courts to "fix" the cur-
rent faulty system (or to substitute another for it), they must be pre-
pared to respond to the influx of legislators and judges, and to the
consequences of the legal decisions that will be made.
V. CONCLUSION
There is abundant evidence that the criminal justice system is
characterized by faulty views of deviance and how to respond to it and
by failed policies and procedures. The same can be said about the
mental health system. Inductees into these two defective systems are
frequently moved within and between them, with expediency appar-
ently the prime reason for movement.
Those concered about the well-being of children need to study the
merger of these two systems because there is mounting evidence that
the same developmental patterns are well underway in the systems
designed to handle juveniles in need of corrective and therapeutic in-
tervention. As professionals seek to serve these troubled juveniles,
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they can either develop more workable systems or allow the defective
criminal justice model to take further hold.
Legalization of both juvenile systems continues apace. Perhaps
correctional personnel and mental health professionals cannot ade-
quately respond to juvenile "deviance." Perhaps it is time for them to
admit their inability and to acknowledge that only the legal commu-
nity can effectively safeguard the rights of a powerless and defenseless
group with few advocates. Professionals can either take control and
make reforms or mimic the criminal justice system and await the in-
creasingly heavy hand of legalization.
